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Abstract. Coordination failures constitute an alternative explanation for under-
employment that complements the Keynesian and neo-classical views. The paper
proposes to distinguish three classes of models with coordination failures. The
classes are formed by strategic models with or without a coordinating role for
prices, and general equilibrium models. The main insights resulting for each class
of models are exhibited. It is argued that coordination failures are likely to arise
in a decentralized economy, even under conditions where perfect competition could
prevail. The paper concludes by pointing out several promising directions for future
research.
1 Introduction
There are two quite distinct views when studying the underemployment of
resources. One view is the neo-classical view. Underemployment of resources
may occur, but is either a voluntary choice, or a temporary phenomenon
that results from unimportant frictions in the process of matching supply
and demand. This view is expressed by the well-known quote from Friedman
(1968)
At any moment in time there is some level of employment which has
the property that it is consistent with equilibrium in the structure
of real wage rates : : : The `natural rate of unemployment', in other
words, is the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian system
of general equilibrium equations, provided that there is embedded in
them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity
markets.
The Keynesian tradition on the contrary stresses non-rational expecta-
tions and wage and price rigidities in its explanation of underemployment of
resources. This lead has been followed in theories on temporary equilibrium,
see Grandmont (1987) for a survey, and in the x-price literature, originating
from the work of Benassy (1975), Dreze (1975), and Younes (1975). The x-
price literature allows for a consistent modeling of the consequences of trade
?
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at non-Walrasian prices, including the modeling of spill-over eects to other
markets caused by price rigidities in one market.
The typical argument made against the x-price literature is that it fails
to explain why prices are rigid, and in particular why prices might deviate
from Walrasian values for prolonged periods of time. Within the general equi-
librium paradigm, there are at least three possible responses to this question.
Blad (1978) stresses that price adjustment processes need not converge to an
equilibrium, and that convergence, even if it takes place, can take quite some
time. This view is reinforced in Weddepohl (1997), where it is shown that a
discrete time ta^tonnement process can generate periodic and chaotic paths.
Secondly, Herings (1997) and Tuinstra (2000) show that political interference
in the market mechanism can be rational from a partisan point of view and
might be responsible for sustained deviations from prices that clear markets.
Thirdly, Dreze and Gollier (1993) and Dreze (2001) argue that price rigidi-
ties are a response to market incompleteness. This argument is particularly
valid for the two forms of underemployment most frequently encountered,
unemployed labor and excess capacities. These are two clear examples of
commodities for which future markets are hardly developed.
Notwithstanding the importance of the models in the x-price tradition,
it is by no means clear that they encompass all that can be said about under-
employment of resources. One is lead to wonder whether underemployment
of resources is impossible when expectations are rational and prices attain
Walrasian values, a conclusion that seems to emerge from the neo-classical
literature. Any underemployment resulting under these ideal circumstances
is said to be caused by coordination failures.
This paper identies three classes of models with coordination failures.
The rst class consists of rather abstract game-theoretic models, following the
seminal work of Bryant (1983). This part of the literature makes it very clear
that coordination failures are perfectly consistent with rational expectations.
They lack, however, a coordinating role for the price mechanism. Strategic
models with a coordinating role for prices constitute the second class. It is
argued that outcomes in strategic models are often not robust to slightly
dierent specications of the model. Moreover, strategic models usually only
permit a partial analysis, and this only under very specic assumptions with
respect to the economic primitives. The third class of models consists of gen-
eral equilibrium models of coordination failures. This class extends a partial
analysis to a global one, and leads to results that are quite general. Section 2
lists the contributions of the game-theoretic literature on coordination fail-
ures. The following three sections discuss the three model classes. The nal
section concludes and highlights some issues that gure prominently on the
research agenda.
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2 Coordination Games
The analysis of economies where Walrasian prices prevail and where agents
make rational decisions has been the centerpiece of economics for a long
time. In this setting, the Walrasian allocation is within reach, and, in the
absence of externalities, is known to be Pareto optimal. This is the central
message of the rst welfare theorem. It is clear that any underutilization of
a valuable resource, that is a resource with a positive price, is bound to lead
to ineÆciencies. Underutilization of resources is not even second best in this
case. If trade takes place at Walrasian prices, and all agents behave rationally,
then moving to the Walrasian allocation leads to a Pareto improvement. This
suggests the following as a general denition of a coordination failure: If
society fails to reach an outcome that is feasible and that everyone prefers,
then the members of society have failed to coordinate in some way.
A mere inspection of the denition of a coordination failure may suggest
a coordination failure is far-fetched. If a feasible Pareto improving outcome
exists, it seems that rational agents should be able to enforce it in one way
or another. A simple game-theoretic insight reveals that this is not the case.
Consider the normal form game with two players depicted in Figure 1. This
L R
1 0
T
1 0
0 2
B
0 2
Fig. 1. A pure coordination game
game has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (T,L) and (B,R). Moreover,
there is one equilibrium in mixed strategies, where the actions T and L are
chosen with probability 2/3 by agents 1 and 2, respectively. Despite the ex-
tensive literature on renements of Nash equilibrium, none of the existing
equilibrium renements can exclude any of the three Nash equilibria as being
nonsensible. It is clear that the Nash equilibrium (T,L) suers from severe
coordination failures.
It is obvious that a far majority of players will be able to coordinate
on (B,R), which has been conrmed in experiments. Moreover, a number
of more sophisticated approaches in the literature that attempt to model
communication, also reach the conclusion that (B,R) should be played by
rational players. Kalai and Samet (1985) show that a multistage unanim-
ity game where non-cooperative players end up at an equilibrium which is
symmetric and persistent leads to the play of (B,R). Herings, Mauleon and
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Vannetelbosch (2001) show that the possibility to make a commitment not
to play certain strategies combined with the use of a mediator that produces
an arbitrary match within the remaining strategies when possible, leads to
the play of (B,R).
A more serious challenge is posed by the stag hunt game depicted in
Figure 2 that is taken from Aumann (1990). A player has the choice to hunt
R D
7 8
R
7 0
0 9
D
8 9
Fig. 2. The stag hunt game
rabbit or deer. A player can hunt rabbits by himself, and get a guaranteed
payo of at least 7. To hunt deer, the collaboration of others is needed. The
potential payos of hunting deer are equal to 9, but are also quite risky. It
is only if the other player also chooses to hunt deer that these payos are
collected. Otherwise the player is left with payos equal to 0.
The most frequently applied game-theoretic solution concept, the one of
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, species two possible solutions. Either both
players hunt rabbits, or both players hunt deer. Both players have payos
equal to 7 in the former equilibrium, versus payos of 9 in the latter. None
of the existing equilibrium renements rules out one of the two equilibria.
Notice that communication will not be of great help in this game. Both
players would like to invoke the other one to choose D, and will announce to
do so themselves. But when actually making their decision, they might well
choose the safe strategy R. Contrary to the game in Figure 1, experiments
reveal a frequent occurrence of the Pareto dominated outcome (R,R).
In fact, it is possible to make a case for the play of (R,R) on at least three
dierent accounts. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that the solution to a
game should not change if one adds a constant to the payo of a player, where
the constant depends only on the strategy chosen by the player's opponent.
The reason is that addition of such a constant does not change the best
response correspondence of the game. Adding the constant -8 to the payo
of a player when the opponent chooses D, shows that the game of Figure 2
is equivalent to the one depicted in Figure 3.
Any argument that was used to motivate the lower-right cell as the most
sensible outcome in the game of Figure 1, can now be used to argue that
the Pareto dominated outcome (R,R) results in the game of Figure 3. This
equilibrium is called the risk dominant equilibrium by Harsanyi and Selten
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R D
7 0
R
7 0
0 1
D
0 1
Fig. 3. Transformation of the stag hunt game
(1988). For general symmetric 2x2 games with two strict Nash equilibria,
the risk dominant Nash equilibrium is the one that consists of the strategies
players would choose if they believe each of the actions of the opponents to
be played with equal probability. A risk dominant Nash equilibrium need not
be Pareto optimal.
A second argument for the play of the risk dominant Nash equilibrium
comes from Carlsson and van Damme (1993). They show how a small amount
of uncertainty about the coordination game that is actually played, forces
players to take a global perspective, in which they can reason themselves to
the play of the risk dominant equilibrium.
Finally, Ellison (1993), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young
(1993) take the perspective of repeated play of a coordination game by myopic
players. Players choose in each period the action that performed best in the
previous period, but do so subject to mistakes. They show that the resulting
dynamic system is most frequently in the state where all players choose the
risk dominant action.
3 Strategic Models of Coordination Failures
Bryant (1983) provides an economic model with coordination failures. Con-
sider an economy consisting of nN individuals. The individuals are located
at N  2 separate sites with n individuals at each site. Each site produces
an intermediate good, that is transformed into a nal output by means of
a Leontiev technology. The amounts I
1
; : : : ; I
N
of intermediate goods are
transformed into N minfI
1
; : : : ; I
N
g units of the nal output. The intermedi-
ate goods are produced from leisure on a one for one basis. Individuals care
about leisure and the consumption of the nal output. For simplicity it is
assumed that the nal output is divided equally among all individuals.
The crux of the model is that each site decides independently from the
other sites how much of the intermediary good to produce. This captures
the essence of the specialized, multi-staged and decentralized production that
characterizes an advanced economy. When a site has to determine the amount
of intermediary good to be produced, it is not informed about the amounts
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produced at the other sites. It is therefore important that there are at least
two sites.
Bryant's model admits a straightforward competitive analysis. The con-
stant returns to scale production process xes the real wage to be equal to
one. The rst order conditions for utility maximization then require that each
household supplies an amount I of leisure in return for I units of the nal
output, where I is such that the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for
consumption equals one.
Bryant's model as formalized above is simply a normal-form game, which
is analyzed by considering its Nash equilibria. One possible Nash equilibrium
coincides with the competitive solution. Given that all other individuals put
in I units of leisure, it is optimal for an agent to supply I units of leisure
himself. Supplying more than I units does not lead to more consumption
because of the Leontiev technology, but is costly as it provides less leisure.
Supplying less than I units leads to less consumption and more leisure, but
involves a utility loss if the utility function is strictly quasi-concave.
Surprisingly, the reasoning above remains true for any eort level I less
than I: If all other individuals put in I < I units of leisure, an agent does
not want to supply less than I units himself, since the marginal rate of sub-
stitution of leisure for consumption is more than one at eort level I < I:
An agent does not want to supply more than I units, since that does not
lead to more consumption because of the Leontiev technology. The strategy
tuples where all individuals supply I  I units of labor characterize the set of
symmetric Nash equilibria. There is a continuum of equilibria, ranging from
a no-trade equilibrium to a competitive equilibrium. Almost all equilibria
display coordination failures. Even though the competitive equilibrium is an
outcome, the arguments of Section 2 imply that it is not obvious that agents
are able to coordinate on it.
Indeed, the structure of Bryant's game is similar to the one of the stag
hunt game. Suppose that there are only two sites, there is only one individ-
ual per site and individuals have only two eort levels; either an individual
remains inactive or an individual provides the competitive eort level. In the
former case, the individual knows for sure that there will be no consumption
of the nal output. In the latter case, there will only be consumption of the
nal output if the other individual provides the competitive eort level, oth-
erwise the individual will not consume any nal output, while still making
all the eort. It might well be that remaining inactive corresponds to the risk
dominant Nash equilibrium.
Bryant's model has been generalized in Cooper and John (1988), who
consider a special class of symmetric normal form games with I agents. Each
agent i has to choose an eort level e
i
2 [0; E]: Given eort levels e
 i
chosen
by the opponents of player i; a payo of (e
i
; e
 i
) results for player i: Typical
assumptions are that payos increase when all eort levels are increased
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simultaneously, and that the marginal payo of increasing one's eort level
diminishes in eort.
Since the normal form games considered are symmetric, it is useful to
introduce the notation V (e
i
; e) for the payo to agent i when he chooses
eort level e
i
; whereas all others take action e: The utility maximizing eort
level for agent i; when all other agents choose eort level e; is denoted by
e

i
(e):
The model is analyzed by considering its symmetric Nash equilibria. Al-
though there might in general be Nash equilibria with dierent agents provid-
ing dierent eort levels, the imposition of an anonymity requirement implies
a restriction to symmetric Nash equilibria. It is easily veried that eort levels
chosen in a symmetric Nash equilibrium belong to the set S given by
S = fe 2 [0; E] j V
1
(e; e) = 0g;
where V
1
is the partial derivative of V with respect to its rst argument.
An obvious question to ask is under what conditions the eort levels
chosen in the model are Pareto optimal. The symmetric Pareto optimal eort
levels are found by maximizing V (e; e) over e: The eort levels which satisfy
the necessary rst order conditions are given by
e
S = fe 2 [0; E] j V
1
(e; e) + V
2
(e; e) = 0g;
where V
2
is the partial derivative of V with respect to its second argument.
The eort levels chosen are ineÆcient whenever V
2
(e; e) 6= 0: In plain
economic terms, the condition that V
2
(e; e) be zero is called the absence
of externalities. Both positive and negative externalities lead to suboptimal
eort levels, with positive externalities leading to too high eort levels and
negative externalities to too low eort levels. Since it seems plausible that
higher eort levels by others increase the value of V; it is natural to assume
positive externalities. As a consequence, eort levels chosen in a decentralized
economy are lower than rst best eort levels.
It is here that a rst weakness of the model is exhibited. Higher eort levels
by other agents do not imply higher values of V in an economic analysis that
is carried out in the traditional way. Higher eort levels lead to higher output,
which, at a given price per unit, implies higher revenues for the agent that
made the eort. Externalities caused by the eort levels chosen by others are
absent as soon as trade in commodities is guided by prices. When prices are
around to coordinate economic decisions, the underinvestment in eort may
well disappear.
Under what conditions may coordination failures arise? To answer that
question, it is analyzed rst under what conditions multiple equilibria may
arise. Since an eort level e that corresponds to a symmetric Nash equilibrium
satises e = e

i
(e); multiple equilibria can only exist if the best response
function e

i
is upward sloping. The best response function is characterized by
8 P. Jean-Jacques Herings
solutions to V
1
(e
i
; e) = 0: By an application of the implicit function theorem,
it follows that the slope of e

i
at e equals  V
12
(e

i
(e); e)=V
11
(e

i
(e); e):
Under the standard assumption that V is concave, i.e. the marginal ben-
ets from eort are decreasing, we nd that V
12
> 0 is a necessary condition
for the existence of multiple equilibria. The latter condition is well-known
in economics, and is called the case of strategic complementarities in Bulow,
Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985). It states that an increase in the eort
level of others increases the marginal benets of an increase in the individual's
eort level.
If there are multiple equilibria, and positive externalities, then multiple
equilibria give rise to coordination failures. Evaluating the utility of an agent
along the best response function yields
dV (e

i
(e); e)
de
= V
1
(e

i
(e); e)
de

i
(e)
de
+ V
2
(e

i
(e); e)
= V
2
(e

i
(e); e) > 0;
where the second equality follows from the fact that e

i
is characterized by the
condition V
1
(e

i
(e); e) = 0: It follows that the symmetric Nash equilibria are
Pareto ranked by the equilibrium action. Moreover, higher action equilibria
are preferred to lower action equilibria.
4 Strategic Models of Coordination Failures with a
Coordinating Role for Prices
Coordination failures may result when there are strategic complementaries
and positive externalities. The latter is a natural assumption in an abstract
model as in Section 3, but less so when trade takes place on markets and is
guided by prices. It is of crucial importance to give more economic esh to
the skeleton set up in the previous section. To achieve this goal, one needs
a closed and complete economic model with a role for prices and wages to
coordinate economic activity.
In a model with an explicit role for prices, it is possible to analyze a num-
ber of interesting issues. It would be possible to study whether involuntary
unemployment may occur, where involuntary unemployment is said to exist
if there are workers who are unable to sell as much of their labor as they
desire at the given wage, or to study whether unemployment is possible with
competitive prices.
Roberts (1987) presents a model that meets our criteria. It is the simplest
model of a closed economy that allows for coordination failures in a strategic
setting. There are ve commodities, X;Y;R; S; and M; four types of agents,
A;B; J; and K; and n  2 agents of each type. The commodities X and Y
are outputs, R and S are inputs, and M is a commodity that serves as a
store of value. Agents of type A and B are producers, and agents of type J
and K are workers.
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Producers of type A and B have endowments 
A
and 
B
of commodity
M: This is the only commodity that enters their utility functions. Producer
A has the knowledge to transform input R into output X: Producer B knows
how to transform input S into output Y: Production takes place by means of
a constant returns to scale technology; one unit of input yields one unit of
output.
A worker of type J has an endowment (; 
J
) of R;M; and a worker
of type K has an endowment (; 
K
) of S;M: Worker J derives utility from
consumption of Y;R; andM; and workerK from X;S; andM: Notice that no
pair of agents has a mutually advantageous trade. Producer A needs inputs
from worker J; but sells his output to worker K: Producer B needs inputs
from worker K; but sells his output to worker J:
The separation of a rm's customers and workers models consumers that
specialize in supplying labor, but generalize in consuming outputs. Not only
is this a characteristic of the way most economic activity takes place. It also
limits strategic eects. A rm cannot increase the demand for its output by
raising its wages, and the supply of inputs to a rm does not directly depend
on its price and output levels.
The model consists of three stages. In the rst stage each rm states a
price for its output and a wage for its input. Next each worker announces the
amount of input they want to sell to each rm and of output they want to
buy. Finally, each rm decides how much of these oers and orders to accept.
Since there are n agents of each type, the rst stage results in an n-tuple
of prices and wages for output X and input R and an n-tuple of prices and
wages for output Y and input S: When announcing the amount of inputs to
be sold to each rm, workers are required to take into account the feasibility
constraint that they cannot sell more inputs than they initially own. When
accepting orders and oers, rms are subject to the technological constraints
that the total of accepted output orders cannot exceed the total of accepted
input oers.
The model described above species explicitly how all prices and quan-
tities result from individual choices. It also leads to consistent modeling of
out-of-equilibrium behavior. Any sequence of actions, rational or not, leads to
clearly dened and feasible outcomes. The typical way to analyze this model
is by determining its subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium, each agent correctly forecasts the strategies the others are
using and these strategies are best responses to each other at every deci-
sion point, including those that would not be reached if behavior actually is
generated by the specied strategies.
The model can also be seen as a special case of a general equilibrium
model, and can be analyzed by means of its Walrasian solutions. A Walrasian
solution is a price-wage vector and an allocation that satises a number of
conditions. Prices and wages should be identical for all agents of the same
type. Given prices and wages, workers maximize their utility subject to their
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budget constraint and the condition that the most they can supply of the
input is their initial endowment. Producers maximize prots, that is con-
sumption of good M; subject to the available technology. Finally, prices and
wages should be such that all markets clear.
Roberts (1987) shows that, given any Walrasian solution, there is a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium such that all rms announce the Walrasian
prices and wages, and the resulting allocation is the Walrasian one. To be
more precise, the prices and wages specied by all producers in the rst stage
equal Walrasian prices and wages. Because of the constant returns to scale
technologies, this implies that the price of output X is less than or equal
to the wage for input R; and the price of output Y is less than or equal to
the wage for input S; with equality holding if there is a positive production
level of an output. The total input supplied by a worker in the second stage
and the total output delivered by a producer in the third stage, following the
quote of Walrasian prices in the rst stage, should be equal to the Walrasian
amounts. This still allows for many possible equilibrium strategies, since the
Walrasian solution does not specify who delivers to whom. Any equilibrium
strategy that is consistent with the total amounts specied by the Walrasian
solution will do.
A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium should also specify the behavior o
the equilibrium path. If, given Walrasian prices and wages, consumer choices
dier from Walrasian ones, then let rms maximize prots given the actual
orders and oers. No rm gains by cutting its price while raising its wage.
If any rm deviates from the Walrasian price and wage in a dierent way,
then specify all orders to and oers from it as zero. Workers dealing with the
deviating rm go to other rms and have their Walrasian orders and oers
lled. Notice that if all workers act in this way, then this kind of behavior
is optimal, even when a deviating rm has raised both its price and wage
or lowered both. At any price-wage vector at which more than one rm is
deviating from the Walrasian levels, specify any subgame equilibrium, for
instance one with all orders and oers being zero. It can be veried that the
strategies specied above constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that
leads to the Walrasian outcome.
The Walrasian outcome is not the only one that can be sustained as a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Consider some Walrasian solution, and
any integer k; 0  k  n: There exists an equilibrium in which all rms
announce the Walrasian prices and wages, and in the equilibrium k of the
consumers of each type get their Walrasian allocations and the n k remaining
consumers of each type receive their initial endowments, buying and selling
zero amounts. The arguments needed to show this result are similar to the
ones used in the previous paragraph. Note in particular that an inactive rm
sees no demand for the output that hiring a worker yields, and will therefore
decide not to hire such a worker in the rst place. This phenomenon is caused
by the strict separation of workers and consumers.
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There exist at least n equilibria in the model, most of which are charac-
terized by ineÆciently low levels of output and involuntary unemployment,
everything at Walrasian prices. Since the framework used is rather specic, it
is important to consider how robust these results are to the exact specication
of the game.
Jones and Manuelli (1992) consider a slightly dierent game. Up to now it
is assumed that goods are produced on a \made-to-order" basis. A precom-
mitment on the part of the buyers is needed before any production can take
place. Jones and Manuelli (1992) consider the case where goods are manufac-
tured for inventory. They assume exactly the same primitives as before (ve
goods, four types of agents, utility functions, endowments and technology),
but a slightly dierent institutional set-up.
Suppose now that the second stage is disentangled into two stages, sepa-
rating the announcement of input oers and the placement of output orders.
The latter is now supposed to occur at the very end. The complete institu-
tional set-up of the game is therefore as follows. In the rst stage rms set
wages and prices. In the second stage workers announce the amount of input
they want to sell. In the third stage rms decide how much of these oers
to accept, and production takes place. In the fourth stage workers announce
how much output they want to buy.
Production on a made-to-order basis and production for inventory lead
to quite distinct conclusions. In particular, it is not diÆcult to show that the
no-trade equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium in the latter specication,
unless the endowments are already Pareto optimal. Suppose, on the contrary,
that the no-trade equilibrium can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium. Then, at the beginning of the fourth stage, workers have supplied
none of their inputs. They will express a demand for output, to be paid out of
their holdings of commodityM: As a consequence, rms facing some demand
for sure in the fourth stage are willing to hire labor in the third stage, and
workers are willing to oer labor in the second stage. The no-trade solution
cannot be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Jones and Manuelli (1992) show that for any choice of prices and wages
in the rst stage, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium continuation of
the game. The vast multiplicity of equilibria obtained in the made-to-order
model is therefore ruled out. For separable utility functions, it can also be
shown that workers are neither rationed in the labor market, nor in the goods
market. The intuition is that a producer would otherwise either lower its wage
or increase its price. In particular, there is no involuntary unemployment in
this case.
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5 General Equilibrium Models of Coordination
Failures
Strategic models of coordination failures lead to quite distinct conclusions,
dependent on seemingly minor issues in the precise modeling of an economy.
Strategic models of coordination failures lack the generality that one would
need to be more condent about the importance of their results. It is therefore
natural to search for general equilibrium models of coordination failures.
Conclusions in a general equilibrium setting tend to be robust to both minor
modeling details and the particularities of the economic primitives.
A robust multiplicity of equilibria was shown to occur in the traditional
x-price model in Herings (1996), thereby extending earlier work of van der
Laan (1982). Moreover, in Herings (1998) it was shown that the set of equi-
libria possesses a particular connectedness property. Although the x-price
model seems to explain underutilization of resources as a consequence of trade
at \wrong" prices, there is no need to rely on such prices for the multiplicity
of equilibria to appear, as was also observed in observed in Citanna, Cres and
Villanacci (1997).
The interpretation of the multiplicity of equilibria as coordination fail-
ures and the link to the macro-economic literature on coordination failures
surveyed in the previous two sections was made by Jacques Dreze, resulting
in the papers Dreze (1997) and Herings and Dreze (1998). The exposition in
this section is a simplied version of the latter paper.
1
Consider the classical general equilibrium model withH households and F
rms. A rm f is described by its production possibility set Y
f
: A household
h is characterized by its consumption set X
h
; utility function u
h
; initial
endowment e
h
; and shares 
fh
in the prots of rm f: Suppose that trade
takes place against Walrasian prices p

; so unconstrained total supply equals
unconstrained total demand at prices p

:
A deviation from the standard framework occurs by assuming that it is
not common knowledge that the prices are Walrasian. Even when all agents
know that prices are Walrasian, it is not necessarily the case that all agents
know that all other agents know that prices are Walrasian, and it is even less
likely that all agents know that all other agents know that all other agents
know that prices are Walrasian, and so on. Common knowledge that prices
are Walrasian requires structural knowledge about the economy, very much at
odds with the standard general equilibrium paradigm that in a decentralized
economy agents only have to maximize utility given the prices that are quoted
in the market place.
When it is not common knowledge that prices are Walrasian, it no longer
makes sense for agents to express their unconstrained demands and supplies.
In particular, they should form expectations on supply and demand possi-
1
A merger of that paper with Citanna, Cres and Villanacci (1997) resulted in the
one of Citanna, Cres, Dreze, Herings and Villanacci (2001).
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bilities of all commodities. One particular instance of such expectations are
the very optimistic expectations that supply and demand possibilities always
exceed supply and demand desirabilities. If all agents hold such optimistic
expectations, they will nd out that their expectations are justied, and they
will consume the Walrasian allocation.
There can be other expectations apart from the very optimistic ones.
The intriguing question is whether such expectations can be self-conrming.
An underemployment equilibrium of the economy consists of expectations
on supply possibilities that are self-conrming.
2
Those expectations are said
to be self-conrming if the utility maximizing demand of households given
these expectations equals the prot maximizing supply of rms given these
expectations, all optimization taking place at Walrasian prices.
The set of underemployment equilibria is reduced further by imposing
an additional rationality constraint on the expectations. It makes sense to
model explicitly that in case of excess supply, there is some rationing system
that species how much each agent may supply. The simplest case of such a
rationing system is the uniform rationing system, where for each commodity
there is a maximal amount to be supplied that is common to all agents. The
set of underemployment equilibria is reduced by requiring that the expecta-
tions of the agents are compatible with the prevailing rationing system.
It is straightforward that apart from the very optimistic Walrasian expec-
tations, there is also an equilibrium with very pessimistic no-trade expecta-
tions. When all agents expect that no supply of any commodity is possible
such expectations become self-conrming. Firms maximize prots by remain-
ing inactive. Indeed, they expect no demand for their output, and avoid any
cost of production. As a consequence, households have no way to earn in-
come, resulting in the absence of any purchasing power, and the consump-
tion of their initial endowments. Total constrained demand matches total
constrained supply and is equal to zero for all commodities.
There are many more underemployment equilibria. The formal result
states that there is a connected set of underemployment equilibria that ranges
from a no-trade equilibrium to an underemployment equilibrium with very
optimistic expectations in at least one market. Examples show that the latter
equilibrium may or may not be the Walrasian equilibrium. Typically, the set
of underemployment equilibria is a one-dimensional continuum. Intuitively,
this can be explained as follows. There are as many instruments, in this case
expectations levels, to achieve market clearing as there are commodities. But
by virtue of Walras' law there is no need to clear the last market when all but
one markets are in equilibrium. One degree of freedom is left over, leading to
the one-dimensional continuum. There are not only multiple equilibria, but
also coordination failures as the Walrasian equilibrium is typically strictly
2
Because of the interest to analyze unemployment, the focus is here on expecta-
tions on supply possibilities. The extension to expectations on demand possibil-
ities is straightforward.
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Pareto superior to the no-trade equilibrium, or any underemployment equi-
librium in the neighborhood of a no-trade equilibrium.
A highly stylized example with one production sector and one represen-
tative household can be used to illustrate the result mentioned above. The
production sector produces output from labor. The representative household
consumes output and supplies labor. The production sector and the house-
hold have to form expectations about the maximal supply of output and the
maximal supply of labor possible. If the production sector expects that the
total demand for output is low, they will hire only a limited amount of labor.
This has a negative impact on the income of the representative household,
and thereby leads to a low demand for outputs, exactly conrming the ex-
pectations of the production sector. The result implies that innitely many
expectation levels, varying from very pessimistic to very optimistic, are con-
sistent with equilibrium.
The result makes clear that the observation of excess supply is not suÆ-
cient to infer the existence of price and wage distortions. Downwards pressure
on prices or wages is not very helpful to get out of this situation. When prices
or wages are not at Walrasian values, similar coordination failures exist, and
will even be compounded by the traditional consequences of \wrong" prices.
Pareto improvements can only be made by a simultaneous recoordination of
expectations of all agents, by no means an easy task to accomplish.
6 Conclusion
The paper exhibits coordination failures as an interesting source of unem-
ployment, which complements the traditional neo-classical and Keynesian
views. Economic models with coordination failures can be classied in three
categories; two types of game-theoretic models and one class of general equi-
librium models. In all cases, coordination failures arise as a consequence of
self-conrming pessimistic expectations.
An issue not touched upon in Section 5 is the distinction between nomi-
nal prices and real prices. Section 5 formulates the model in real terms. The
nominal specication is probably more desirable, since in reality commodi-
ties are not exchanged against commodities, but against money. A model in
nominal terms necessitates an explicit modeling of money demand and sup-
ply. Although there seem to be no major obstacles to extend the model by
a monetary sector as in Dreze and Polemarchakis (1999), it remains to be
veried that its structural properties will not change.
For very simple game-theoretic models, theories of equilibrium selection
exist. These theories amount to theories of expectation formation in the set-
ting with coordination failures. The available theories of expectation for-
mation make clear that there is no reason that coordination on the Pareto
dominant equilibrium takes place. Considerations related to risk dominance
turn out to be of crucial importance. The extension of the ideas of equilib-
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rium selection in game theory to equilibrium selection in general equilibrium
theory seems a natural next step to take.
A particular problem for equilibrium selection in general equilibrium the-
ory is that this theory has not made much progress in modeling out of equi-
librium behavior. With innitely many equilibria around to coordinate on,
coordination on one equilibrium seems a task too heroic to impose on agents.
A model with a full-edged dynamic specication of expectation formation,
in a general equilibrium setting, and including the specication of trading
processes out of equilibrium, remains highly desirable.
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